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A standard rule of thumb in journalism tells us that three of anything 
is a trend. Whatever the subject, high or low, no journalist will consider 
something a trend until he or she can find three examples. Once they are 
found, however, the newspapers and other outlets will fill with pieces 
gushing that “everybody’s doing it.”1 
In the bit of trendspotting that follows—or, to lend it some dignity, in 
this analysis of an emerging theme in First Amendment scholarship—we 
have many more than three examples. Consider the titles of some recent 
papers by leading First Amendment scholars: Facts and the First 
Amendment;2 Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment;3 and 
‘Telling Me Lies’: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements 
of Fact.4 Consider, too, the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in 
the Stolen Valor Act case, United States v. Alvarez,5 and the emerging 
                                                   
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Michael Pardo, and Mark Tushnet for comments, Noah Jones and Michele Marron for 
research assistance, and the editors of the Washington Law Review for their perceptive questions 
and their patience. The author retains the copyright n this article and authorizes royalty-free 
reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal 
citation to the Washington Law Review. 
1. Daniel Radosh, The Trendspotting Generation, RADOSH.NET (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.radosh.net/writing/trends.html (quoting the Philadelphia Daily News); see also id. (“The 
rule of threes is revered and so readily called upon that it trumps common sense: No matter how 
many mouths were involved, Mike Tyson, Christian Slater and Marv Albert do not indicate, in any 
meaningful sense, a trend in biting.”). 
2. Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010). 
3. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, (UC Davis Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 276, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1935106.  
4. Mark Tushnet, ‘Telling Me Lies’: The Constitutionality of Regulating False Statements of Fact 
(Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 11-02, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737930.  
5. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011). 
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scholarship on that case.6 Consider other recent cases raising similar 
issues.7 Finally, consider the book that is the subject of this Symposium: 
Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First 
Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State.8 
The puzzle all these writers are addressing is epistemological,9 a 
question about the nature, legitimacy, and sources of knowledge.10 
                                                   
6. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Amicus Curiae Brief: Boundaries of the First Amendment’s “False 
Statements of Fact” Exception, 6 STAN. J. C.R. &  C.L. 343 (2010); Josh M. Parker, Comment, The 
Stolen Valor Act as Constitutional: Bringing Coherenc  to First Amendment Analysis of False-
Speech Restrictions, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1503 (2011).  
7. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1324 
(2010) (upholding a federal bankruptcy law that required law firms offering bankruptcy services to 
provide information about bankruptcy assistance and related services); Planned Parenthood Minn., 
N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding in part, and reversing in part, an 
injunction against a South Dakota law that required physicians to tell patients seeking abortions that 
“the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being”).  
8. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
9.  See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, EPISTEMOLOGY: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY 
OF KNOWLEDGE (Paul K. Moser ed., 2d ed. 2002); Matthias Steup, E istemology, STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ 
(“[E]pistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief.”). 
10. A slightly extended note on terms is called for he e. I use some language more loosely here 
than I should, although the kinds of distinctions that concern epistemologists feature in remarkably 
few discussions within First Amendment scholarship. Although I distinguish between “true” and 
“false” speech, and refer generally to “knowledge,” epistemology’s primary concern is with justified 
true beliefs. For the most part, that is the concer of this Article. The focus on justification is most 
relevant in Part III, infra, which focuses on expert knowledge and its relationship to the First 
Amendment. For general discussion, see Steup, s ra note 9. For discussions within or adjacent to 
First Amendment scholarship, see, for example, Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of 
Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039 (2009); Mark Spottswood, Falsity, Insincerity, and the 
Freedom of Expression, 16 WM. &  MARY BILL RTS. J. 1203 (2008); Nat Stern, Defamation, 
Epistemology, and the Erosion (but Not Destruction) f the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REV. 
595 (1990). For discussions of lawyers’ tendency to describe knowledge imprecisely, possibly 
because law tends to focus on practical reason rather than on proper justifications for knowledge, 
see, for example, Peter F. Lake, Posner’s Pragmatist Jurisprudence, 73 NEB. L. REV. 545, 579–80 
(1994); id. at 580 n.154; Madison, supra, at 2043 (“Law and policy speak of knowledge in broader, 
looser, and more general terms [than philosophy] . . . .”); Steven Walt, Some Problems of Pragmatic 
Jurisprudence, 70 TEX. L. REV. 317, 324–30 (1991). 
I elide some further problems and distinctions that are important to epistemology but beyond the 
scope of this Article, including debates over the pr cise nature of knowledge and the so-called 
“Gettier problem.” The Gettier problem points out that the presence of truth, belief, and justification 
may not be sufficient for “knowledge” where “the evidence that justifies a proposition bears only an 
accidental or coincidental relation with the truth of the proposition.” Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 
82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 126–27 (2007); Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 
ANALYSIS 121 (1963). Kenneth Simons has argued that the Gettier problem has little general 
significance for law. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 541 
n.267 (1992). But see Michael S. Pardo, The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof, 16 LEG. THEORY 37 
(2010) (arguing that the Gettier problem, and the relationship between truth and justification 
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First Amendment jurisprudence routinely stresses the equality of 
speakers,11 refuses to allow government to regulate expression on the 
basis of its content,12 and emphasizes that “there is no such thing as a 
false idea.”13 But how does the First Amendment deal with facts? Even 
if Post is right that a central value of the First Amendment is the 
protection of “public discourse”14 and the ideas and opinions it involves, 
public discourse still rests on a factual foundation. 
Not all facts are equal. People are entitled to have different opinions 
about where Barack Obama was born and who his parents were. But 
those opinions presuppose that there is a fact of the matter. How do we 
know what is true? How, in particular, do c urts ascertain what is true? 
And what does the First Amendment say about all this? If not all “facts” 
are equal in life, should they nonetheless be treated s equals in law? 
In this Article, I treat the recent interest in these epistemological 
issues as an opportunity to explore an important aspect of Post’s project: 
the uneasy role of truth within First Amendment doctrine, and the 
relationship between courts and those institutions that we view generally 
as epistemically reliable sources of knowledge. My examination 
suggests that the First Amendment faces what I call an epistemological 
problem: specifically, the problem of figuring out j st how knowledge 
fits within the First Amendment. 
The growing attention to the epistemology problem aong leading 
First Amendment scholars is significant enough to warrant examination. 
Although I offer some views of my own, my approach is primarily 
descriptive. We must see the epistemological problem clearly before we 
can do anything about it (if anything can be done, that is). That is the 
goal of this Article. 
Part I presents some basic theoretical and doctrinal v ews concerning 
free speech and its relation to epistemological questions. I show that 
                                                   
generally, is more important to law than the literau e generally supposes). I thank Michael Pardo 
for discussion on these issues, and absolve him of responsibility for what follows.  
11. The classic source is Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First 
Amendment, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 20 (1975). For recent examinations, see, for example, Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Kenneth Karst’s Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
37 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and 
Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409 (2003). 
12. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”).  
13. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
14. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 
617, 628–29 (2011). 
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current theory and doctrine recognize, but do not resolve, a host of 
difficult questions about the relationship between truth, falsity, 
knowledge, and freedom of speech. I offer as an example the recent 
litigation over the federal Stolen Valor Act, which was heard this Term 
in the U.S. Supreme Court. Part II analyzes the recent scholarship 
discussing these epistemological questions. Part III draws on Post’s 
book and my own forthcoming book on what I call “First Amendment 
institutions.”15 I ask whether we can say more about what Post calls “the 
relationship between the marketplace of ideas and the production of 
expert knowledge.”16 In other words, are there ways that First 
Amendment law could better protect or encourage the production of 
useful facts? Part IV presents some conclusions about the relationship 
between knowledge, truth, and the First Amendment. The Conclusion 
seeks to move the conversation forward by speculating bout the reasons 
for the recent surge in scholarly interest in this question. 
I. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM IN FIRST 
AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
To understand the claim that there is an epistemological “problem” in 
the First Amendment, it is helpful to start with the basics. I focus on 
standard theories of freedom of expression and basic First Amendment 
doctrine. In both areas, we find conflicting attitudes concerning the 
relationship between free speech and qualities like knowledge, truth, 
fact, and opinion. 
A. First Amendment Theory 
The free-speech theory that addresses epistemologica  questions most 
directly is the “truth-seeking” justification. Its most influential advocate 
is John Stuart Mill, whose On Liberty offers a largely truth-centered 
argument for freedom of speech.17 Frederick Schauer calls Chapter Two 
of the book “the definitive expression of the (social) epistemic 
arguments for freedom of expression—the ways in which freedom of 
expression functions as an indispensable aid in the societal identification 
                                                   
15. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (Harvard University Press, 
forthcoming 2012) (manuscript on file with author). 
16. POST, supra note 8, at xi. In his Symposium contribution, Joseph Blocher raises much the 
same point, asking “how expert knowledge enters into public discourse, and how public discourse 
can accommodate it once it arrives there.” Joseph Blocher, Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, 
and the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 409, 413 (June 2012). 
17. JOHN STUART MILL , ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., 2003). 
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of truth (and exposure of falsity) and, thus, in the fostering of public 
knowledge.”18 
Mill draws on a venerable argument: that truth, if left to its own 
devices, would triumph in what we now call the “marketplace of 
ideas.”19 Strikingly, however, Mill focuses on false speech, not true 
speech.20 It seems obvious that true speech is worth defending, but less 
obvious that false speech should be protected. Yet Mill makes precisely 
that point.21 
Mill makes three arguments.22 First, an idea we assume to be false 
may actually be true.23 Second, some ideas can contain elements of both 
truth and falsity, so that suppressing a falsehood also depriv s us of what 
is true.24 Finally, false speech has a value of its own: it can result in “the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its 
collision with error.”25 
Despite its centrality to the free speech tradition, Mill’s argument tells 
us less about the relationship between knowledge and the First 
Amendment than we might suppose, for two reasons. First, Mill assumes 
that the “typical impulse to suppress [speech] is ba ed on the alleged 
falsity of the idea or articulation to be restricted.”26 This move allows 
him to focus “entirely [on] the benefits and risks of restricting 
expression based upon its supposed falsity,”27 but does not tell us how to 
determine whether speech is true or false. 
                                                   
18. Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On 
Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2011). 
19. See, e.g., id. at 587 n.61. 
20. See, e.g., Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1215. 
21. See M ILL , supra note 17, at 121 (cautioning that some speech could be limited, regardless of 
its truth status, in cases in which the speech will do immediate harm—when “the circumstances in 
which [words] are expressed are such as to constitute heir expression a positive instigation to some 
mischievous act”). A similar statement, with an added distinction between true and false speech, is 
Holmes’ famous line that the First Amendment does not protect one who “falsely shout[s] fire in a 
theatre and caus[es] a panic.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (emphasis added). 
See generally Vincent Blasi, Shouting “Fire!” in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 535 (2011). 
22. MILL , supra note 17, at 118. For useful discussion, see Schauer, s p a note 18; Spottswood, 
supra note 10, at 1214–18. 
23. MILL , supra note 17, at 118. 
24. Id. at 112, 118. 
25. Id at 87. 
26. Schauer, supra note 18, at 576; Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1215 (“Mill assumes during his 
argument that the only reason we might wish to suppress expression is because we believe it to be 
false.”); see also MILL , supra note 17, at 88 (“Those who desire to suppress [opini n], of course 
deny its truth.”). 
27. Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1215. 
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Second, his examples of false speech involve matters of opinion, such 
as “open questions of morals,”28 not more mundane facts. “Even in this 
most influential of the epistemic arguments for freedom of speech,” 
Frederick Schauer writes, “Mill was not to any appreciable extent 
addressing issues of demonstrable and verifiable fact.”29 
This second problem might be self-limiting where fre speech law is 
concerned. On Liberty is driven by Mill’s famous harm principle, under 
which speech and other actions should only be suppressed to prevent 
harm to others.30 As a practical matter, given the finite time and 
resources of government regulators, the more mundane  factual 
statement is, the less likely it is to be suppressed. Government may wish 
to restrict speech advocating tyrannicide; and it may, consistent with the 
harm principle, wish to restrict false statements that could cause serious 
and immediate harm. But a false statement that the sky is red, or that 
Millard Fillmore was our fifth President, is unlikely to interest 
government censors, either for its own sake or for reasons of guarding 
against potential harm. 
Still, Mill’s account leaves two important epistemological questions 
unanswered. First, what value should we assign to narrow factual 
statements? Second, how do we know whether those statements are true 
or false? 
Other prominent justifications for freedom of speech are less focused 
on epistemological matters, but still give rise to similar questions. To 
take one example, the argument that free speech is necessary to support 
individual autonomy may say something about epistemic issues. Thus, 
David Strauss argues that First Amendment law can distinguish between 
manipulative lies and inadvertently false statements, because the former 
deliberately “interfere with a person’s control over her own reasoning 
processes.”31 But truth and falsity are secondary considerations here. 
We might say the same thing of justifications for free speech based on 
its importance to democratic self-government. One who values a free 
and informed citizenry engaging in public deliberation might also agree 
with the truth-seeking argument that unfettered politica  speech will 
                                                   
28. MILL , supra note 17, at 86 n.*. 
29. Schauer, supra note 2, at 905; see also JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY , 
FRATERNITY 74–77 (Maurice Cowling et al. eds. 1967). 
30. MILL , supra note 17, at 80. On the relationship between Chapter One of On Liberty, which 
sets out the harm principle, and Chapter Two, which discusses the value of protecting false ideas, 
see Schauer, supra note 18.  
31. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
334, 354 (1991). 
09 -- Horwitz FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:17 AM 
2012] THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 451 
 
result in more truth. Given the democratic justificat on’s focus on the 
political process, however, an advocate of free speech based on 
democratic self-government might just as easily conclude that “political 
truth is what the people decide through democratic processes, without 
regard to whether what is politically true happens to be epistemically 
true.”32 
Ultimately, neither rationale resolves the epistemological questions 
that lurk within the First Amendment. They do not tell us how to 
distinguish true from false statements, or how to deal with the “shades of 
grey between earnestly believing that what you say i  true and being 
certain that it is false.”33 They say little about who should make such 
determinations and how. 
Two additional justifications for freedom of speech are worth 
mentioning, because they may lead to different approaches toward these 
epistemological questions. The first justifies the First Amendment 
primarily on the grounds of distrust of government.34 According to this 
view, government cannot use its “legal authority to identify and enforce 
any particular version of right and wrong, or truth and untruth.”35 An 
anti-paternalistic approach would lead to a general refusal to regulate 
false statements—not because we value falsity, but because we are 
reluctant to hand over to the state the authority to make such 
determinations. 
The anti-paternalistic argument offers a valuable reminder that the 
question of institutional allocation—who gets to deci  what is true or 
false—is as important as the value of true and false statements 
themselves. To those who say there is “no social value in the 
dissemination of falsehood, particularly knowing falsehood,”36 Steven 
Gey responds that the harm of false speech is outweighed by the harm of 
empowering government to decide whether that speech is true or false.37 
As a practical matter, however, this argument is incomplete. Under 
current and well-settled law, government routinely makes such 
determinations. Outside what Schauer calls the “boundaries” of 
                                                   
32. Schauer, supra note 2, at 910. 
33. Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1224. 
34. See Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination of Socially Worthless 
Untruths, 36 FLA . ST. U. L. REV. 1, 16–20 (2008); see also Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism 
Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579 (2004). 
35. Gey, supra note 34, at 21. 
36. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 25. 
37. See Gey, supra note 34, at 22. 
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conventional First Amendment coverage,38 in such areas as securities 
fraud, the government evaluates (and punishes) statements on the basis 
of their truth or falsity.39 Indeed, it does so even within the boundaries of 
conventional First Amendment coverage. It regulates false and 
misleading commercial speech,40 and even defamatory political speech 
involving public officials if actual malice is involved.41 An anti-
paternalist argument that leaves this regulatory authority in place leaves 
much to be explained. 
Finally, consider the civic courage argument.42 This is the argument 
that speech—even false speech—can help develop the kind of civic 
character that is necessary for self-government.43 Its exemplar is Justice 
Brandeis’ view that “the final end of the state [is] to make men free to 
develop their faculties,” that courage is “the secret of liberty” and that 
“the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”44 Absent grave and 
imminent danger, the remedy for false or dangerous speech “is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”45 
I find the argument from civic courage powerful,46 but it leaves 
important questions unanswered. Why is civic courage not a sufficient 
remedy in the many areas in which First Amendment law permits 
regulation, including false statements about public figures made with 
actual malice, or false or misleading commercial speech? As an 
empirical matter, moreover, how do we know that Brandeis was right? Is 
it really true that leaving false speech unregulated conduces to civic 
courage, or that the benefits of civic courage outweigh the dangers of 
false speech? 
The foregoing discussion suggests two conclusions. First, 
                                                   
38. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
39. See id. at 1778–79. For cases rejecting First Amendment challenges to securities fraud 
prosecutions, see, for example, SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F. 3d 233, 255 (4th. Cir. 2009), and 
SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F. 2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
40. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
41. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
42. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic 
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 653 (1988). 
This argument is, I think, distinct from the argument for the importance to public discourse of what 
Post calls “democratic legitimation.” I discuss that argument in Part III. 
43. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 21, at 541–42.  
44. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
45. Id. at 377. 
46. See generally Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech. A Review of Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of 
Free Speech and Liberalism Divided, 43 MCGILL L.J. 445 (1998) (book review).  
09 -- Horwitz FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:17 AM 
2012] THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 453 
 
epistemological questions are closely bound up withfree speech and its 
justifications, whether directly or indirectly. Second, whatever their 
merits, the standard free speech justifications pose difficult questions 
about the relationship between knowledge, truth, and free speech. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the truth-seeking justification, and its 
accompanying marketplace of ideas metaphor, have becom  far less 
prevalent in contemporary free speech scholarship.47 “[T]he free speech 
literature appears increasingly to have detached its lf from the empirical 
and instrumental epistemic arguments” made by Mill and others, 
focusing instead on the other justifications canvassed here, such as 
arguments from democracy or autonomy.48 I discuss below some of the 
reasons why that shift might have occurred.49 For now, however, I take 
the shift mostly as a given rather than applauding or criticizing it. 
However, it is important. To the extent that these other justifications are 
less directly concerned with answering the First Amendment’s 
epistemological questions, they suggest that these questions are fated to 
remain unresolved. 
B. First Amendment Doctrine 
The same questions are present in First Amendment jurisprudence. I 
focus here on just a few examples of the U.S. Supreme Court’s shifting 
views about the connection between truth, falsity, and free speech. Using 
academic freedom as a focus, I also examine the Court’s views about the 
relationship between the First Amendment, the acquisition of 
knowledge, and the institutions that help us acquire it. 
Of course, the Court has also addressed these epistemological 
questions indirectly. Many laws, especially those concerning defamation 
and commercial speech,50 contain permissible “restrictions on false, 
deceptive, and misleading communications.”51 The Court has treated 
other laws involving potential falsity, such as perjury, fraud, and speech-
related crime, as falling outside the boundaries of the First Amendment 
altogether.52 The instances below involve more direct discussions f 
truth, falsity, and free speech. 
                                                   
47. Schauer, supra note 2, at 910. 
48. Id. at 909–10. 
49. See, e.g., Conclusion, infra. 
50. See, e.g., Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1207–13; Gey, supra note 34, at 5–6. 
51. Jonathan D. Varat, Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat 
Curious Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1108 (2006). 
52. See generally Schauer, supra note 38.  
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1. Conflicting Dicta on Truth, Falsity, and Free Speech 
A prominent discussion of the potential value of false speech, 
drawing directly on Mill, can be found in the Court’s influential decision 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.53 Justice Brennan, quoting from On 
Liberty, wrote: “Even a false statement may be deemed to make a 
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brngs about ‘the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with 
error.’”54 
This statement suggests that even false speech deserves constitutional 
protection. In a pattern that would repeat itself over the years, however, 
the Court soon retreated. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,55 the Court 
stated: 
 
[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. 
Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially 
advances society’s interest in “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open” debate on public issues. They belong to that category of 
utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.56 
 
Gertz thus appears to reject the Court’s Millian view in Sullivan. It 
denies the intrinsic value of false speech. It does recognize, however, 
that even if false statements are worthless, the difficulty of proving the 
truth or falsity of a statement may still require some protection for false 
speech. “The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood 
in order to protect speech t at matters.”57 
The Gertz Court also opined: “Under the First Amendment there is no 
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opi ion may seem, we 
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but 
on the competition of other ideas.”58 This statement illustrates the 
multilayered nature of the First Amendment’s epistemological problem. 
                                                   
53. 376 U.S. 254 (1976). 
54. Id. at 279 n.19 (citation omitted). 
55. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
56. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, and Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
57. Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 339–40. 
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On its face, it suggests that “ideas” are neither true nor false.59 But its 
reference to “judges and juries” also reminds us of a practical concern: 
that of proof. Given the courts’ epistemic limits, hey must sometimes 
refrain from deciding whether a statement is “true” or “false.” 
3. Knowledge and the First Amendment: The Case of Academic 
Freedom 
Finally, consider academic freedom. A central concer  of Post’s 
book, academic freedom is an area in which the Court has dealt with the 
connection between truth and the First Amendment at an institutional 
level. Courts treat the university as a central institutional player in the 
search for truth. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,60 Chief Justice Warren’s 
plurality opinion emphasized the truth-seeking justification for academic 
freedom, arguing that without protection for the scholarly production of 
“new discoveries” in the field of knowledge, “our civilization will 
stagnate and die.”61 
It is worth noting that the Sweezy plurality does not focus on 
inculcating democratic values within the university, or insist that 
universities observe democratic norms. Rather, its focus is on the 
contributions that universities make to democracy by advancing the 
search for truth.62 Academic freedom “is prized primarily because its 
contribution to truth-seeking will yield discoveries or insights that . . . 
benefit society at large.”63 
In an example of the ways in which truth-seeking justifications for 
free speech have been “folded into . . . justification[s] sounding more in 
democratic theory” than epistemology,64 the Court’s treatment of 
academic freedom has wandered away from the truth-seeking 
justification over time. Consider Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the 
University of New York.65 Although that opinion compares the classroom 
to the “marketplace of ideas,” it does so for democrati  and egalitarian 
purposes, not just epistemic ones.66 “The Nation’s future depends upon 
                                                   
59. Although this raises questions that would confront the Court in later cases—in particular, 
whether it is possible to distinguish “opinions” from “facts.” See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal 
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17–20 (1990). 
60. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
61. Id. at 250. 
62. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 483–84 (2005). 
63. Id. at 484. 
64. Schauer, supra note 2, at 910. 
65. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
66. See Horwitz, supra note 62, at 489. 
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leaders trained through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than 
through any kind of authoritative selection.’”67 The concern here is with 
the value of diverse speech within the classroom. Although Keyishian 
pays lip service to the competition for truth within the marketplace of 
ideas, it “is less interested in the results of that competition than it is 
in . . . . the training and shaping of the nation’s citizens.”68 
The cases involving affirmative action in higher education display a 
similar movement away from an emphasis on knowledge its lf and 
toward an emphasis on other values, such as diversity and democratic 
legitimacy.69 Thus, in Grutter v. Bollinger,70 the Court wrote that 
“universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition” and 
deserve judicial deference.71 But its defense of universities’ “special 
niche” within the First Amendment was different than the one offered in 
Sweezy. The right of a university to select its own students had less to do 
with its entitlement to autonomy as a truth-seeking institution, and more 
to do with diversity’s democratic benefits. “Effective participation by 
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is 
essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized,” wrote 
Justice O’Connor.72 It was especially important that elite academic 
institutions be racially diverse, given their role in cultivating “a set of 
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”73 
This is a far cry from the truth-seeking justification offered for 
academic freedom in Sweezy. Indeed, it is not an epistemological 
justification at all. By the time Grutter was decided, academic freedom 
had been largely assimilated into the arguments for free speech based on 
democratic legitimacy and self-governance.74 In this context, the 
relationship between diversity and truth-seeking was almost irrelevant.75 
                                                   
67. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted). 
68. Horwitz, supra note 62, at 489. 
69. Cf. POST, supra note 8, at 27–28, 34 (discussing “democratic legitima on”). 
70. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
71. Id. at 328. 
72. Id. at 332. 
73. Id. 
74. See Horwitz, supra note 62, at 500–01; see also Jack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, 
and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610, 1619 (2003) (“Justice O’Connor structures hr 
argument so that preparation for the world beyond graduation has the constitutional protection of 
being a subset of academic freedom.”). 
75. The U.S. Supreme Court recently granted certiorai in another case involving affirmative 
action in higher education, thus potentially putting all these issues back on the table. S e Fisher v. 
Univ. of Texas, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012, No. 11-345).  
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The First Amendment case law thus offers a couple of l ssons. The 
most important one is that the Court’s discussion of the relationship 
between truth, knowledge, and the First Amendment has been 
inconsistent. The Court sometimes argues that the discovery of truth is a 
vital justification for the First Amendment. At other times, however, it 
subordinates that argument to other concerns, such as democratic 
legitimacy. It has difficulty dealing with basic concepts and 
propositions, including the distinctions (if any) between facts and 
opinions, true and false statements, and so on. Although it has reached 
sensible conclusions, such as that some fraudulent statements can be 
regulated, it has done so inconsistently and without adequate 
justification. It has not told us clearly, for example, why citizens can 
generally be relied on to distinguish between true and false statements 
made in the political realm76 and not in other areas, such as commercial 
speech or securities fraud. 
C. The Stolen Valor Act: A Current Example of the First 
Amendment’s Epistemological Problem 
These epistemological questions are at the forefront of a case the U.S. 
Supreme Court heard this Term, United States v. Alvarez.77 Alvarez 
involves a prosecution under the Federal Stolen Valor Act, which makes 
it a crime to falsely represent that one has been awarded a military 
decoration or medal.78 The defendant was an elected official who said at 
a public appearance: “I’m a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the 
year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. I got wounded many times by the same guy. I’m still around.”79 
Alvarez was “still around,” but nothing else in the statement was true.80 
The Stolen Valor Act presents a snapshot of the epist mological 
questions the Court has left unaddressed, or answered inconsistently, in 
its First Amendment jurisprudence. The statute deals only with false 
statements of fact, not opinions or ideas. It is not restricted to knowingly 
false statements of fact;81 even inadvertent misrepresentations are 
                                                   
76. See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (applying Sullivan’s actual malice standard 
to a case involving a law prohibiting false statements made by candidates for public office). 
77. 617 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011). As of this writing, the 
decision is still pending. 
78. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2011). 
79. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
80. Id. at 1200–01. 
81. Congress has since proposed to limit the statute’s scope to misrepresentations made 
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covered. 
The majority and dissenting opinions in the Ninth Circuit are 
instructive on the epistemological issues raised by the Stolen Valor Act. 
The key difference between them concerns the constitutional value of 
false speech. For the majority, the notion that “all false factual speech is 
unprotected” under the First Amendment is mistaken.82 Its default rule is 
that “all speech” is protected from “government interference,” absent 
some compelling reason “other than the mere fact that [a statement] is a 
lie.”83 The majority rejects the argument that the case is controlled by 
Gertz’s view that “the erroneous statement of fact is not w rthy of 
constitutional protection,”84 concluding that false statements can only be 
regulated when closely tied to a specific harm involving “low-value” 
speech.85 Its rationale is largely one of distrust of government.86 But it 
also reasons that the default assumption that all false speech is capable 
of regulation puts the burden of proof in the wrong place87—an 
essentially epistemological point. And it insists that “at least some 
knowingly false statements of fact,” including satire, fiction, and 
hyperbole, can have “affirmative constitutional value.”88 
For Judge Bybee, who dissented, Alvarez’s knowingly false statement 
fell outside the boundaries of First Amendment protection altogether.89 
The only exception he was willing to entertain concer ed cases in which 
“protecting a false statement is necessary ‘in order to protect speech t at 
                                                   
knowingly and with the intent to obtain something of more than de minimis value. See Stolen Valor 
Act of 2011, H.R. REP. NO. 112-1775, at 1 (2011); S. REP. NO. 112-1728, at 1 (2011).  
82. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1205–06. 
83. Id. at 1025 (emphasis in original).  
84. Id. at 1202 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)). 
85. See id. at 1205 (“[W]e presumptively protect all speech against government interference, 
leaving it to the government to demonstrate, either rough a well-crafted statute or case-specific 
application, the historical basis for or a compelling need to remove some speech from protection (in 
this case, for some reason other than the mere fact th t it is a lie).”); id. at 1213 (“In sum, our review 
of pertinent case law convinces us that the historical and traditional categories of unprotected false 
factual speech have thus far included only subsets of false factual statements, carefully designed to 
target behavior that is most properly characterized as fraudulent, dangerous, or injurious conduct, 
and not as pure speech. We are aware of no authority lding that the government may, through a 
criminal law, prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly factually false.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
86. Id. at 1205 (“[T]he right to speak and write whatever one chooses—including, to some 
degree, worthless, offensive, and demonstrable untruths—without cowering in fear of a powerful 
government is, in our view, an essential component of he protection afforded by the First 
Amendment.”). 
87. Id. at 1204. 
88. Id. at 1213. 
89. Id. at 1220 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  
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matters,’” 90 a category he treated fairly narrowly.91 Bybee’s default rule 
was the exact opposite of the majority’s: false statements are 
presumptively unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Concurring in the denial of en banc review, Chief Judge Kozinski 
directly addressed the value of false speech, arguing that “white lies, 
exaggerations and deceptions . . . are an integral part of human 
intercourse.”92 “[T]ruth is not the sine qua non of First Amendment 
protection,”93 he argued. Autobiographical speech “is intimately bound 
up with a particularly important First Amendment pur ose: human self-
expression.”94 If it is to avoid being reduced to “the monotonous 
reporting of strictly accurate facts about oneself,” autobiographical 
speech will inevitably include half-truths and outright falsehoods, all of 
which serve potentially valuable purposes: to “protect . . . privacy,” to 
“avoid recriminations,” to “prevent grief,” to “save face,” and so on.95 
Upholding the Stolen Valor Act would open the floodgates for the 
regulation of commonplace falsehoods that ought to be left to the “pull 
and tug of social intercourse.”96 
How the Supreme Court resolves the Alvarez case will depend on a 
couple of doctrinal questions. The central question is where false 
statements fit within the distinction between high- and low-value 
speech.97 That distinction was set out some seventy years ago in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,98 which famously declared that “[t]here 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
                                                   
90. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 
(1974)). 
91. See, e.g., id. at 1221 n.1, 1223 (“The Supreme Court has told us con istently that the general 
rule is that false statements of fact are unprotected, and has carved out certain limited exceptions t 
this principle in certain contexts.”). A similar approach was taken by Judge O’Scannlain in his 
dissent from the denial of en banc review in the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Alvarez, 638 
F.3d 666, 681 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
92. Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 673 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 674; see also David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s 
Protection of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70 ( 2012). 
95. Alvarez, 638 F.3d at 674–75 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
96. Id. at 675. 
97. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (1989); Arnold H. 
Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 58 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 195 (2001); 
Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297 (1995); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Low Value Speech Revisited, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 555 (1989). I assume in this discussion 
that the Court will join most of the lower courts in construing the Stolen Valor Act to require 
knowingly false statements of fact. 
98. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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prevention and punishment of which has never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words’ . . . .”99 
Those kinds of speech “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, 
and are of such slight social value as a step to tru h hat any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”100 Over time, the Court has brought some of those 
categories, such as libel, back within the First Amendment fold.101 But 
the basic distinction remains. 
Two Terms ago, in United States v. Stevens,102 the Court revisited 
Chaplinsky when it reviewed a federal statute criminalizing depictions of 
animal cruelty.103 The government argued this speech was of such low 
value that it was “categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.”104 
From a reasonable observer’s perspective, the minimal value of this 
speech might seem obvious. But the Court refused to engage in an 
interest-balancing inquiry in order to determine which categories of 
speech fall into the low-value category, focusing instead on their 
“historic and traditional” nature.105 The Court acknowledged that 
Chaplinsky seemed to suggest such a balancing inquiry, but denie  that 
this formula should be applied to each new proposed category.106 
Similarly, last Term, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,107 the 
Court said it would require a “historical warrant” before recognizing 
new categories of low-value speech.108 The government would have to 
provide “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of 
a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”109 Thus, in 
Alvarez, the Court will have to decide whether false statements of fact 
are a new category or a very old one. 
There is some warrant for the view that false statements of fact are 
                                                   
99. Id. at 571–72 (citations omitted).  
100. Id. at 572.  
101. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 38, at 1776; Horwitz, supra note 15. 
102. 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010). 
103. Id. at 1582–83 (2010) (describing the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006)). 
104. Id. at 1584. 
105. Id. (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
106. Id. at 1586 (rejecting any “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment”).  
107. 564 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
108. Id. at 2734. 
109. Id. 
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“part of a long . . . tradition of proscription.”110 Ultimately, however, I 
find it hard to square that argument with the Court’s recent decisions. 
The language in Stevens suggests that such a broad and free-floating 
category, absent a more specific context, is constitutionally 
problematic.111 In its insistence on a historical warrant for new 
categories of low-value speech, the Stevens Court said it had only 
recognized such a category where it found a close cnnection to some 
specific and traditionally proscribable harm. It took as an example its 
decision in New York v. Ferber,112 which upheld a statute criminalizing 
the advertising and sale of child pornography.113 It described Ferber as 
having been grounded not on a “‘balance of competing interests’ alone,” 
but on the integral connection between the market for child pornography 
and its production, which has long been illegal.114 Although the Court 
has recognized the low value of false statements in specific contexts, it is 
hard to conclude that false statements per se are a “special case” that 
demand an exception from the general coverage of the First 
Amendment.115 
If the Court’s decisions in Stevens and Brown are read as meaning 
that low-value speech must generally be limited to historically 
recognized categories, and thus as a rejection of any case-by-case 
balancing of interests, then the epistemological elem nts of Alvarez will 
fade in importance, regardless of the outcome. The case will turn on 
historical inquiry, not on a direct evaluation of the value of false 
statements of fact. 
Despite its emphasis on history, however, the Court has not rejected 
interest-balancing altogether. In order to determine whether false 
statements of fact fall within a traditional (albeit “heretofore 
unrecognized”) category of low-value speech, it will inevitably have to 
ask whether they share the fundamental characteristic of such categories: 
namely, that “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the 
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case 
adjudication is required.”116 
                                                   
110. Id.  
111. See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does 
not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and 
benefits.”).  
112. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
113. See id. at 765. 
114. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764). 
115. Id.  
116. Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763–64). 
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More broadly, Stevens represents a judgment about the First 
Amendment itself. The First Amendment, the Court observed, “reflects a 
judgment by the American people that the benefits o its restrictions on 
the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any 
attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is 
not worth it.”117 This statement is essentially a form of cost-benefit 
analysis. It suggests that, in general, the benefits of preventing 
government from regulating speech—even false speech—outweigh the 
harms of that speech. 
This may be a key article of the American faith, but it is also an 
empirical question—an “experiment,” as Justice Holmes described the 
First Amendment, to see whether “the best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”118 
Despite their historical gloss, cases like St vens ultimately rest on a view 
about the value of different kinds of speech, and the costs and benefits of 
regulating them. 
In sum, Alvarez still brings us back to the epistemological questions 
with which we began this Part: How do we know what is true or false? 
How much does it matter? And how should our judgments on those 
questions affect First Amendment law? 
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM REVISITED: CURRENT 
SCHOLARLY INTEREST IN TRUTH, FALSITY, AND THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
It is unsurprising that these sorts of epistemological questions have 
interested First Amendment scholars. What is more su prising, perhaps, 
is the sudden intensity of this interest. In the last few years, a number of 
leading scholars have focused on various aspects of these questions: the 
constitutional status and social value of false statements of fact; the 
courts’ disparate treatment of false statements in different areas (such as 
dishonest campaign promises versus securities fraud); the constitutional 
value of true factual statements; and the relationship between First 
Amendment law and the institutions in which knowledg  is produced 
and verified. 
In this Part, I lay out some of the basic questions, and much more 
                                                   
117. Id. at 1585.  
118. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally 
Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 LEG. THEORY 1 
(1996); Frederick Schauer, Is It Better to Be Safe than Sorry?: Free Speech and the Precautionary 
Principle, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 301 (2009). 
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tentative answers, that recent scholarship on the First Amendment’s 
epistemological problem has provided. I focus in particular on the 
constitutional value of true and false statements. 
A. The Constitutional Status of True Facts 
If one of the key purposes of the First Amendment is to advance the 
search for truth, one might assume that true factual statements deserve 
substantial protection. Milton’s Areopagitica, a forerunner of Mill’s On 
Liberty and a major influence on the development of freedom of speech, 
refers to the persecution of Galileo for challenging Church orthodoxy on 
astronomy.119 Wouldn’t it be odd to give greater protection to a 
completely mistaken attack on heliocentrism than to a simple statement 
of the fact that the Earth revolves around the sun? 
In fact, as Schauer points out, “the relationship of the First 
Amendment to questions of hard fact” has received little sustained 
attention.120 On Liberty, the “most epistemically focused of free speech 
arguments,” dealt with ideas, not facts.121 Even in a legal field in which 
truth might be expected to play a substantial role—d famation or 
seditious libel—it took some time for the truth of an allegedly 
defamatory statement to be accepted as a successful defense to that 
charge.122 The courts’ primary concern was not with accuracy s such, 
but with the potential of defamatory statements to harm the state or 
individual reputations.123 
Although “issues of fact . . . have become an increasingly large part of 
First Amendment doctrine and writings” in the past half-century or so,124 
Ashutosh Bhagwat has observed that “[t]he question of what level of 
First Amendment protection should be accorded to true, factual speech” 
remains “largely unexplored.”125 To the extent that we may draw a 
general conclusion from the mass of cases addressing the legal status of 
“detailed, factual speech,”126 the conclusion Bhagwat draws is 
surprising: across a range of areas, true facts have been accorded 
                                                   
119. See Vincent Blasi, John Milton’s Areopagitica and the First Amendment, 13 COMM. LAW. 1, 
15 (1996); Burt Neuborne, Speech, Technology, and the Emergence of a Tricameral Media: You 
Can’t Tell the Players Without a Scorecard, 17 HASTINGS COMM. &  ENT. L.J. 17, 20 n.14 (1994). 
120. Schauer, supra note 2, at 899. 
121. Id. at 905. 
122. See id. at 904, 907. 
123. See id. at 903–04. 
124. Id. at 907. 
125. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 3. 
126. Id. at 6. 
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relatively little protection. To the extent that this speech has been 
protected, it has had more to do with the political n ture of the speech 
than with its accuracy.127 
As Bhagwat shows, the courts have often refused to protect the 
dissemination of true but potentially harmful facts.128 The publication of 
personal information about doctors who perform abortions, in a context 
in which that information constitutes a “true threat” to those physicians, 
can be enjoined.129 A former CIA agent can be punished for revealing 
the names of undercover agents, resulting in harm to agents and 
intelligence operations.130 Providing instructions on income tax evasion 
can lead to a criminal conviction.131 The publication of details on how to 
manufacture hydrogen bombs can be enjoined, although much of the 
information was already in the public domain, because collecting the 
information in one place could assist foreign countries seeking to jump-
start their own nuclear weapons programs.132 
These cases have one thing in common. In each case, the truth of the 
published information was central, not incidental, to the loss of First 
Amendment protection. From a truth-seeking perspective, those are 
puzzling results. 
There are two explanations for this; both raise epist mological 
questions. First, these true statements were closely related to serious 
harms. Planned Parenthood133 and Haig134 serve as examples. 
Publishing accurate information about abortion doctors, when other 
abortionists had already been killed and (in the court’s view) the web 
site could be understood to encourage further killings, presented both an 
immediate harm to the doctors—the threat of harassment, the need to 
change their addresses, and a chilling effect on their willingness to 
perform a legal procedure—and an imminent harm of vi lence.135 In 
those circumstances there was no time to counteract those harms with 
                                                   
127. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517–18 (2001) (shielding a radio station that broadcast 
the details of an illegally intercepted conversation from civil liability, because the speech involved 
matters of public concern). 
128. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 7–38. 
129. Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activiss, 290 F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(en banc). 
130. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 283–87, 309–10 (1981). 
131. United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 621–22, 624 (8th Cir. 1978); Bhagwat, supra note 3, 
at 20. 
132. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 993–95 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
133. 290 F.3d 1058.  
134. 453 U.S. 280.  
135. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063, 1086. 
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“more speech.”136 
Second, for reasons of both epistemology and institutional 
competence, courts might not want to draw a firm line between 
(protected) true speech and (unprotected) false spech. To say that true 
speech is protected while false speech is not implies that it is possible to 
draw such a line—and, just as important, that judges and juries are 
capable of drawing it. The accuracy or inaccuracy of some statements is 
so clear as to present little difficulty for anyone. Other statements, 
however, may exceed lay understanding. Judges and jurors may be 
incapable of assessing their truth or falsity, even if experts in the field 
could.137 Of course, the law has ways of dealing with the proof of 
complex facts requiring expert evidence,138 and appellate courts in First 
Amendment cases can independently review the factual basis of a 
determination by the lower court.139 But those mechanisms raise 
epistemological questions of their own.140 It may thus make more sense 
for judges to focus on whether a statement is harmful than on whether it 
is true or false.141 
Even if we can identify uncontroversially true factual statements, we 
still face the question of how much value to accord them under the First 
Amendment. For Bhagwat, the answer is: not much. 
Consistent with Schauer’s observation that “the fre speech literature 
appears increasingly to have detached itself from . . . empirical and 
instrumental epistemic arguments” in favor of other free speech 
justifications,142 Bhagwat takes as his starting point the view that e 
purpose of the Speech Clause is “to facilitate political dialogue, 
and . . . enable the process of democratic self-governance”143 This 
premise leads him to conclude that true statements of fact are entitled to 
                                                   
136. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
137. See Spottswood, supra note 10, at 1246. 
138. See FED. R. EVID . 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).  
139. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumer’s Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (requiring 
appellate judges in First Amendment cases to engage in searching review of important factual 
determinations in the district court). 
140. See Barry P. McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific 
Research: The Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under th  First Amendment, 54 Emory L.J. 979, 
1080 & n.404 (2005) (noting arguments “against First Amendment protection for scientific research 
on the basis that . . . science does not in fact yield knowledge that is epistemically superior with 
regard to the ascertainment of truth than other forms of knowledge,” and citing sources). 
141. Of course, the determination that speech is harmful itself involves probabilistic and 
empirical judgments; thus, even a focus on harm rathe  than truth cannot completely avoid the First 
Amendment’s epistemological problems. See generally Schauer, supra note 118. 
142. Schauer, supra note 2, at 909–10. 
143. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 40–41. 
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less protection than ideas or opinions—even opinions, like “I believe 
Galileo was wrong,” that are as close to wrong as a statement prefaced 
by the words “I believe that . . . ” can come.144 
Bhagwat concedes that some factual details are “highly relevant to 
self-governance.”145 But he emphasizes that “with respect to many, 
many specific facts, their relationship to any form of self-governance is 
tangential at best, and even when the relationship exists, it is often less 
direct than with respect to pure ideas.”146 What mattered about the 
Progressive’s publication of details concerning the hydrogen bom  was 
not the facts themselves, but the debate over “the wisdom of laws 
seeking to suppress [that] information.”147 Bhagwat recommends that we 
shift our focus away from the accuracy of particular factual details as 
such. Instead, “what is needed is a direct focus on self-governance. 
Factual details should receive protection [only] in proportion to their 
contribution to self-governance.”148 
Schauer and Bhagwat’s articles show both that the constitutional 
value of true facts has been largely unexamined, an that there is a 
renewed interest in addressing this gap. Somewhat surpri ingly, their 
analysis does not necessarily favor robust protection for true factual 
details. For Bhagwat, the truth of a statement is less important than 
whether it contributes to public discourse and whether it is harmful.149 
We might thus conclude that, even as “issues of fact . . . have become an 
increasingly large part of First Amendment doctrine and writings,”150 
judicial and scholarly analysis has moved away from epistemic 
considerations and toward other free speech justifica ions, such as 
democratic self-governance, that place less value in true facts 
themselves. 
That is not necessarily a bad thing. Perhaps those justifications better 
reflect current First Amendment theory and doctrine. Or perhaps this 
shift in focus itself represents a form of epistemic humility: the more 
contested the truth is, the better reason there is for judges to focus on 
other concerns, like democratic self-governance. 
But this approach does not completely avoid the existing epistemic 
questions, and may raise new ones. After all, if “[f]actual details should 
                                                   
144. See, e.g., id. at 6–7, 77–79. 
145. Id. at 44. 
146. Id. at 48. 
147. Id. at 49. 
148. Id. at 66. 
149. See, e.g., id. at 7. 
150. Schauer, supra note 2, at 907. 
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receive protection in proportion to their contribution to self-
governance,”151 or in proportion to the harm they cause, we must still 
decide how much those details contribute to self-governance, the risks of 
harmful but true statements, and whether those risks are outweighed by 
the benefits of offering rigorous protection to true statements. Those are 
difficult questions, and the difficulty is compounded by the need to ask 
in the first place whether certain “facts” really are “true.” 
B. False Statements of Fact 
Regardless of how we treat true statements of fact, one might expect a 
strong consensus that the First Amendment need not protect false 
statements of fact. In support of this proposition, we have Gertz’s 
statement that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact,”152 as well as a broad range of false statements that are 
uncontroversially capable of regulation under current law.153 Even Mill 
concluded that “on a subject like mathematics . . . there is nothing at all 
to be said on the wrong side of the question.”154 
Yet there is some tension here too. From a doctrinal standpoint, we 
can meet Gertz’s sweeping assertion with Stevens’ equally broad 
conclusion that “[t]he First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the 
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.”155 That assertion does not speak to the value of false
statements directly, but it does suggest that the First Amendment 
generally forecloses weighing the value of false spech at all. Against 
Gertz, too, we have the Court’s footnote in Sullivan, adopting Mill’s 
view that “[e]ven a false statement may . . . make  valuable contribution 
to public debate.”156 Moreover, although many cases suggest that false 
speech can be restricted, another set of cases makes clear that “some 
knowingly false statements are protected.”157 
A number of factors, involving varying epistemic considerations, 
appear to be at work in producing this tension. Thus, in Sullivan, the 
Court worried that a legal regime that permits liabi ty for mere careless 
errors of fact in statements concerning public officials would deter true 
                                                   
151. Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 66. 
152. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
153. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 6, at 349 (citing examples). 
154. MILL , supra note 17, at 104.  
155. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010).  
156. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964). 
157. Volokh, supra note 6, at 351 (emphasis added); see id. at 350–51 (citing examples). 
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as well as false speech.158 In other cases, such as those involving false or 
misleading commercial speech, the assumption is that regulation is 
permissible in part because the speaker is in an epistemically superior 
position to evaluate the truth of its statements.159 Thus, these opposing 
outcomes are arguably both epistemically justified. On the other hand, 
some of the reasons courts have protected false statements of fact have 
more to do with a broad distrust of government than with specifically 
epistemic considerations.160 
Several scholars, including Schauer, Gey, Mark Tushnet, and 
Jonathan Varat, have recently focused on the First Amendment status of 
false statements of fact. Surprisingly, despite their differences on 
concrete issues such as the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act,161 
they basically agree that false statements lack epistem c and/or social 
value. I say “surprisingly” because, as we have seen, Mill, one of the 
most influential figures in the philosophical justification of free speech, 
argued that false speech has some genuine value, if only as a whetstone 
for the truth.162 
Support for that argument seems to have eroded. Tushnet puts the 
point starkly. “When all is said and done,” he writes, “there really is no 
social value in the dissemination of falsehood, particularly knowing 
falsehood.”163 We may protect false statements in order to guard against 
laws that would chill true speech, or to prevent ideologically motivated 
attempts to punish or suppress certain kinds of speech, but false 
statements have no inherent value.164 Even Gey, who strongly defends 
the constitutional protection of some clearly false statements, assumes 
they are “socially worthless” and protects them only for anti-
paternalistic reasons.165 
Varat is perhaps the most willing to defend false statements on 
epistemic grounds, although somewhat indirectly. Hemakes two 
                                                   
158. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279; see also Volokh, supra note 6, at 351. 
159. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 
n.24 (1976). Similarly, defenders of the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act argue that the 
speaker in those cases is in the best position to kow whether she received a military decoration or 
not. See, e.g.,Volokh, supra note 6, at 352. 
160. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan can be read as supporting either approach. 
161. For example, Volokh and Varat, colleagues at UCLA, each filed amicus briefs on opposing 
sides in the Alvarez case. 
162. See, e.g., MILL , supra note 17, at 87 (suppressing falsity deprives us of “the clearer 
perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error”). 
163. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 25. 
164. See, e.g., id. at 8–9, 18–20. 
165. See Gey, supra note 34, at 17, 19. 
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essentially instrumentalist arguments. The first, directed at falsehoods 
such as Holocaust denial, is the Brandeisian argument that the truth may 
be better served by publicly attacking lies than by suppressing them 
through legal channels. “Confronting the lie in the arena of public 
discussion may increase the likelihood that the truth will be clearer and 
more long-lived, so that the truth is not forgotten,” he writes.166 “How 
many people are motivated more strongly to remember and solidify the 
true history of the Holocaust because they live in an unfortunate world 
with some who deny it?”167 The other argument is even more 
instrumental: lies may sometimes help us “procure” th  truth, as when 
journalists use deception to “acquir[e] otherwise unobtainable 
information” on matters of public concern.168 
On the whole, though, although some of these scholars argue against 
the constitutionality of particular legal prohibitions on false statements, 
there is little debate over the epistemic or social v ue of those 
statements as such. That fact itself is worth noting, even if it does little to 
resolve particular cases. At a basic level, it tends to confirm Schauer’s 
observation that the truth-seeking justifications that motivated Mill and 
many influential early First Amendment decisions are in relative 
decline.169 
It also suggests something deeper about First Amendt law itself. 
These writers remain willing, for the most part, toprotect even 
deliberately false speech in some contexts, de pite their agreement on its 
lack of epistemic or social value.170 This says something about how we 
construct First Amendment theory and doctrine. There is a kind of 
hydraulic dynamic at work here. As the truth-seeking justification for the 
protection of false statements has receded, other justifications for 
                                                   
166. Varat, supra note 51, at 1119.  
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 1122. As Varat notes, it is unlikely that the law would protect deliberate lies of this 
kind, although it would likely protect the subsequent publication of accurate information obtained in 
this manner. It should also be noted that these kinds of deceptions violate widely shared 
professional journalistic ethics. One can imagine less directly deceptive tactics that would pass legal 
and ethical muster, however. Imagine, for example, a reporter who finds herself sitting near two 
public officials negotiating some corrupt bargain, and who listens in without interrupting and 
identifying herself as a member of the press.  
169. See Schauer, supra note 2, at 909–10. 
170. Tushnet, for example, argues forcefully that lies have no social value, but provides many 
examples of cases in which arguments for their protection have considerable force. See, e.g., 
Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2–3 n.8 (excluding dramatic performances), 8–9 (noting that some lies 
may need to be protected to avoid the incidental deterrence of true speech), 17–18 (warning that the 
regulation of “ideologically inflected” falsehoods, such as that the Holocaust never occurred, could 
be used “as a lever to attack . . . wider ideological views”).  
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protecting them, such as those focused on democratic self-governance or 
distrust of government, have flowed in to take its place. Our theories 
have changed, but the consensus on which speech should be protected 
remains roughly the same. That suggests just how much work our 
intuitions and experience with respect to free speech are doing here, and 
just how secondary and subsidiary our specific theories and justifications 
may be. 
III. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM EXPANDED: 
KNOWLEDGE, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
In this Part, I turn from these general epistemological questions to 
confront more directly one of the primary issues rai ed by Post’s book: 
the relationship between the First Amendment and the production of 
knowledge. I argue that while Post offers some useful answers 
concerning this relationship, another approach—one that focuses on the 
infrastructural role within society of those institu ons in which 
knowledge is generated, and gives them substantial autonomy to regulate 
themselves—might be preferable. 
First, however, let us consider what our examinatio of the First 
Amendment’s epistemological problem has taught us so far. 
A. The Epistemological Problem Recapitulated 
A few simple propositions summarize what we have learn d about the 
relationship between truth, falsity, and the First Amendment. First, there 
is an increasing interest in non-epistemic justifications for freedom of 
expression. Democracy, self-governance, autonomy, and other 
justifications have all “ascended in importance” as primary justifications 
for our system of freedom of speech.171 These approaches raise 
epistemic questions of their own. But their primary focus is not on truth, 
falsity, or justified belief as such. 
Second, even within the realm of truth-seeking justifications for 
freedom of expression, there are fewer answers about the relationship 
between truth, falsity, and the First Amendment than one might expect. 
From Mill to the present, the focus of the truth-seeking argument has 
been on ideas or opinions, not facts. The paradigmat c example involves 
“ideologically inflected” claims,172 such as claims about the existence or 
                                                   
171. Schauer, supra note 118, at 309.  
172. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 18. 
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non-existence of the Holocaust. These claims are closely connected to 
debates over “highly contestable” normative propositi ns.173 They 
present questions of “truth” that extend beyond simply proving or 
disproving a particular factual statement, and raise greater fears that 
government will use its authority in this area to weigh in impermissibly 
on normative questions. 
The combined result is a First Amendment jurisprudence that is much 
less focused on facts themselves. There is no equality in the world of 
facts: it would be absurd to talk of the equal dignity of claims that the 
moon is made of rock and that it is made of cheese. But the slogans of 
the First Amendment, such as Gertz’s statement that there is “no such 
thing as a false idea” under the First Amendment,174 are highly 
egalitarian. More broadly, by forbidding discrimination among speakers 
and ideas, modern First Amendment doctrine emphasizes “the political 
equality that all citizens enjoy within a democracy.”175 Every idea, no 
matter how misguided, and every speaker, no matter how ill-equipped, 
stands on equal footing. Truth and falsity have largely dropped out of the 
equation. 
That observation raises interesting epistemological questions. As I 
suggested at the end of the last Part, however, it is not clear how much 
these questions matter in practice. Our intuition or practical reason may 
be doing more work than our theories.176 In practice, even if we do not 
know why we are doing so, we rarely punish lies “simply because they 
are lies.”177 We look for specific harms, and generally prohibit 
regulations that raise concerns over distrust of government, such as fear 
of ideologically motivated enforcement. As Schauer sums up the 
situation, “public noncommercial factual falsity will likely remain 
constitutionally protected for the foreseeable future.”178 
Thus, the First Amendment’s epistemological problem is only a 
“problem.” Although the free speech theories and doctrines we have 
                                                   
173. Gey, supra note 34, at 8. 
174. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
175. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2011). 
176. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1635–38 (1987); see also Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF . L. REV. 2353, 2355 (2000) (noting that “those fluent in 
the law of free speech can predict with reasonable ccuracy the outcomes of most constitutional 
cases” despite the morass of potentially contradictory rules, doctrines, and theories that populate 
First Amendment law).  
177. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 2. 
178. Schauer, supra note 2, at 915. Even if the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Stolen 
Valor Act, that does not mean it will subsequently uphold any law regulating any falsehood.  
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canvassed raise a host of epistemological questions, a fairly predictable 
and vigorously protective system of freedom of speech ndures. The 
First Amendment’s epistemological problems do not appear to render 
the First Amendment unworkable as a matter of day-to-day practice. 
Incoherent, maybe, but not unworkable. 
B. A Different Epistemological Problem: The Role of Knowledge in 
the First Amendment 
The failure of First Amendment theory and doctrine to fully reckon 
with the role of facts, or “knowledge” more generally, within public 
discourse,179 raises some significant issues that we have not yet 
examined. These issues lie at the heart of Post’s book. 
Of particular importance is the risk that public discourse will end up 
with more falsity than truth, and that some of this falsity will be 
positively toxic. This concern animates Schauer’s recent lecture on facts 
and the First Amendment. There may be good reasons to protect false 
speech, but there are costs as well. We run the risk not only that public 
discourse will overflow with “plainly, demonstrably, and factually false” 
claims, but that people will believe them.180 Millions of Americans 
profess beliefs—that President Obama is a Muslim, that AIDS was 
engineered by the American government, and so on—that are simply 
untrue.181 Once let loose into the marketplace of ideas, they will find 
ready takers. These beliefs can become cascades, gaining dherents at 
dramatically increased rates182 and distorting politics, public discussion, 
and public policy itself. 
Schauer’s concern may be overstated. He worries about an 
“increasing acceptance of patent factual falsity,” and describes a modern 
society “in which truth seems to matter so little.”183 On the whole, 
however, the American public is more intelligent,184 better-educated,185 
                                                   
179. I deal with the definition of public discourse more fully below. Here, I use it as a simple 
term of convenience. I treat it as referring to public discussion generally, especially on matters of 
broad public concern.  
180. Schauer, supra note 2, at 898. 
181. See id. at 897–98. 
182. See generally Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Conspiracy Theories (Harvard Law 
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-03, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1084585. 
183. Schauer, supra note 2, at 919. 
184. See, e.g., JAMES R. FLYNN , WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?: BEYOND THE FLYNN EFFECT 7–9 
(2009) (documenting increases in IQ test scores over the course of the past century). 
185. See, e.g., Gage Raley, Note, Yoder Revisited: Why the Landmark Amish Schooling Case 
Could—and Should—Be Overturned, 97 VA. L. REV. 681, 695–96 & nn.80–81 (2011) (providing 
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and at least no worse-informed than in recent years.186 Long before Al 
Gore invented the Internet, Americans subscribed to a h st of conspiracy 
theories and false beliefs. We would do well to be neither complacent 
nor panicked. 
 Still, the sheer mass of false factual statements that find adherents 
offers some cause for concern. It raises questions about the relationship 
between the First Amendment and the state of public knowledge and 
discourse. In particular, it should lead us to ask whether the search for 
truth has really been well-served by free speech doctrine. Schauer puts 
the point well: “The First Amendment may be embarrassed by the 
proliferation of public falsity, because presumably, from Milton to 
Madison to Mill to Holmes to the present, that is part of what the idea of 
free speech and its particular embodiment in the First Amendment was 
designed to prevent.”187 
So we are left with an important question: If a central goal of the First 
Amendment is to improve the quantity and quality of knowledge in our 
society, but First Amendment doctrine is mostly disabled from 
suppressing false facts and does not necessarily protect true ones, is 
there anything left in our doctrine that can help us enhance public 
discourse, by increasing our knowledge or reducing the number of 
falsehoods in circulation? 
C. Post’s Answer: Democratic Competence and Expert Knowledge 
Practices 
One answer is supplied by Post’s book Democracy, Expertise, and 
Academic Freedom. Post is concerned with the gap between First 
Amendment doctrine and knowledge, or knowledge policy, itself.188 The 
question is especially pressing for Post because hi approach to First 
Amendment theory privileges a particular understanding of public 
discourse, one grounded on what he calls “democratic leg timation”: the 
equal status of citizens as “authors” of the laws, participating on equal 
                                                   
figures showing a substantial increase in education levels in the United States over the past 35 
years). 
186. See Public Knowledge of Current Affairs Little Changed by News & Information 
Revolutions, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE &  PRESS (Apr. 15, 2007), http://www.people-
press.org/2007/04/15/public-knowledge-of-current-affairs-little-changed-by-news-and-information-
revolutions/ (summarizing report showing little decline in level of political knowledge between 
1989 and 2007). 
187. Schauer, supra note 2, at 918. 
188. See POST, supra note 8, at ix–x (describing the book’s subject as “the relationship between 
the First Amendment and the practices that create and sustain disciplinary knowledge”). 
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terms in “the formation of public opinion.”189 He writes: 
It is this equality that underwrites the First Amendment 
doctrine’s refusal to distinguish between good and ba ideas, 
true or false ideas, or harmful or beneficial ideas. The equality 
of status of ideas within public discourse follows directly from 
the equality of political status of citizens who attempt to make 
the government responsive to their views.190 
As Post acknowledges, however, some speech is true, and some false. 
Some ideas are especially important to public discourse and society 
itself. This tension between the democratic equality of speakers, and the 
unequal status of different facts and realms of knowledge that are 
necessary for democracy to flourish, is nothing new. James Madison 
complained: “A popular Government, without popular information, or 
the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy.”191 
Thomas Dewey wrote that “genuine public policy cannot be generated 
unless it be informed by [expert] knowledge.”192 And Hannah Arendt, 
noting that “factual truth informs political thought,” echoed Madison in 
observing that “[f]reedom of opinion is a farce unless factual 
information is guaranteed and the facts themselves ar  not in dispute.”193 
For Post, this means we need to come up with another constitutional 
value besides “democratic legitimation.” He calls this “[d]emocratic 
competence”: the “cognitive empowerment of persons within public 
discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary 
knowledge.”194 
Because “cognitive empowerment is necessary . . . for democratic 
legitimation,”195 we need separate constitutional principles capable of 
protecting each. The First Amendment protects democratic legitimation 
through egalitarian devices such as the rule that there is no such thing as 
a false idea. But we also need “distinct First Amendment doctrines 
designed to protect the social practices that produce and distribute 
                                                   
189. Post, supra note 175, at 482–83. 
190. Id. at 484–85. 
191. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910), quoted in POST, supra note 8, at 35.  
192. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 177–79 (1927), quoted in POST, supra note 
8, at 32. 
193. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE 238 (1968), quoted in POST, supra note 8, 
at 29. 
194. POST, supra note 8, at 34 (emphasis added). 
195. Id.  
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disciplinary knowledge”196—practices in which facts are as important as 
opinions and all speakers are not equal. 
Post purports to find traces of such doctrines across First Amendment 
law. Within the realm of public discourse, this involves a kind of 
alchemy, in which scientific debates are transmuted into differences of 
opinion that courts must abstain from judging.197 Within commercial 
speech doctrine, he sees a complicated mix of factors that serve the 
informational value of advertising, which “conveys factual knowledg  
that cognitively empowers public opinion,”198 while permitting 
government to regulate false and misleading statements that do not 
contribute to cognitive empowerment.199 
More important still is Post’s effort to find evidence of constitutional 
protection for matters of democratic competence in “domains outside of 
public discourse.”200 Take professional speech, an area in which the 
value of the speech is underwritten not by the equality of speakers, but 
by their expertise. We accord strong protection to pr fessional speech 
because professionals operate from a base of specializ d knowledge and 
training, and because they are subject to ongoing monitoring by the 
gatekeepers of their profession. 
Whatever else we might say about the importance of professional 
speech to public discourse, it certainly does not observe the egalitarian 
norms of democratic legitimation. To the contrary, we respect 
professional advice precisely because we know that all opinions on 
professional matters are not equal, and rely on professionals to deliver 
competent advice according to professional standards. In this area, the 
law, through malpractice and its incorporation of professional standards, 
“stands as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert 
pronouncements.”201 Thus, “the very absence of First Amendment 
coverage from the context of malpractice litigation emphasizes the 
significance which law attributes to the circulation of accurate expert 
knowledge.”202 
Although Post describes malpractice law as an instance of the 
                                                   
196. Id. at 33. 
197. Id. at 30–31; see also id. at 44 (“Within public discourse, traditional First Amendment 
doctrine systematically transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”). 
198. Id. at 40–41. 
199. See id. at 41. 
200. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
201. Id. at 45. 
202. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted). 
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“absence of First Amendment coverage,”203 that is not the whole story. 
Malpractice requires a standard by which we determine whether 
professional speech has been competent or incompetent. That is an 
epistemic question, and the sources of judgment will come in the first 
instance from the professional disciplines themselves, through the 
provision of expert evidence in court. For speech lying within the 
domain of democratic legitimation, judges have a suite of tools that are 
more or less judicially manageable and within their basic competence.204 
These are egalitarian standards: the rule of content utrality, the notion 
that all opinions are equal, and so on. The standards that apply to 
democratically competent speech, on the other hand, are neither 
egalitarian nor especially judicially manageable. They must perforce be 
shaped in the first instance by the expert institutions themselves.205 “It 
follows that the value of democratic competence canbe judicially 
protected only if courts incorporate and apply the disciplinary methods 
by which expert knowledge is defined.”206 In those areas, courts will 
“attribute constitutional status to the disciplinary practices by which 
expert knowledge is itself created.”207 
Again, this raises a broader epistemological point. According 
constitutional status to particular disciplinary practices208 requires courts 
to come up with some boundaries—some basis for concludi g that 
certain disciplinary practices fall within the realm of expert knowledge 
and contribute to democratic competence while others do not. “A 
constitutional sociology of knowledge is thus inevitable.”209 In deciding 
which disciplinary practices should be treated as autonomous “expert” 
practices, courts are making judgments, involving a mixture of 
epistemic, sociological, and political considerations, about how we know 
certain things, who knows them best, and how they contribute to public 
discourse. 
D.  The University as a Domain of Democratic Competence 
In theory, for courts to distinguish between particular expert or 
                                                   
203. Id. (emphasis added). 
204. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274 (2006). 
205. See POST, supra note 8, at 31. 
206. Id. at 54. 
207. Id. at 55 (emphasis added). 
208. See id. at 55–58 (noting that courts do not strongly protect all disciplinary practices). 
209. Id. at 58. 
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disciplinary practices raises “deep and intractable” epistemological 
questions about how they can do so.210 At a more practical level, 
however, most of us can identify fairly well at least some of the “key 
liberal institutions that produce expert knowledge.”211 
An obvious candidate is the university, a primary subject of Post’s 
book. The university, and the norms of academic freedom that animate 
it, have long been special concerns for Post.212 This book represents a 
step forward in justifying the constitutional status of academic freedom 
while reconciling it with Post’s broader interest in a democratic 
justification for the freedom of expression. 
Making a point similar to the one we saw in Part II, Post observes that 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s justification for academic freedom has shifted 
over time, moving from a focus on its contribution t  truth-seeking to a 
more egalitarian and democratic justification, in which the university 
contributes to diversity and serves as a training ground for future 
democratic leaders.213 This shift has “produce[d] confusion.”214 It 
equates speech within the university with democrati public discourse 
itself, rather than appreciating that academic speech contributes to public 
discourse precisely by observing on-democratic disciplinary standards. 
Post argues that courts should resist the urge to justify academic 
freedom through egalitarian concepts such as the “marketplace of ideas.” 
Rather, constitutional academic freedom must be understood in terms of 
the underlying “professional norms” of the academy.215 First 
Amendment doctrine must protect the “key liberal institutions that 
produce expert knowledge”216 within our society, but not by subjecting 
them to the general norms of public discourse.217 It should recognize 
                                                   
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 59. 
212. See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN &  ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES 
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009); Robert Post, The Structure of Academic Freedom, in 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 61 (Beshara Doumani ed., 2006). 
213. See POST, supra note 8, at 62; supra notes 60–75 and accompanying text.  
214. POST, supra note 8, at 62. 
215. Id. at 67 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
216. Id. at 59. 
217. Cf. Robert C. Post & Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
GOVERNMENT 1, 13 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002) (discussing the claims of 
advocates for a “logic of congruence” that “the inter al lives of associations should mirror public 
norms of equality, nondiscrimination, due process, and so on” and arguing that this approach 
“potentially trespasses across the boundary that separates civil society from government”); NA CY 
L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN AMERICA 4, 
36 (1998) (describing the logic of congruence and arguing against the insistence that individual 
institutions within civil society “mirror liberal democratic norms and practices”). I make a similar 
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their special role as guarantors of democratic competence and allow 
them to regulate themselves according to their own disciplinary 
practices. 
This is a useful step forward. It does not provide a direct answer to 
the question posed by Schauer: How can the First Amend ent be said to 
enhance the search for truth or the soundness of public discourse when 
so many of its doctrines allow patently false facts to circulate in our 
society?218 But it does provide an indirect answer. Given the egalitarian 
standards that prevail within the First Amendment’s treatment of public 
discourse, we cannot eliminate falsity from this realm. But we can 
recognize and safeguard constitutional enclaves in which genuine 
knowledge, born of disciplinary expertise and policed by disciplinary 
standards, is generated. 
E.  The Paradox and Problems of Expert Knowledge and “Public 
Discourse” 
Post’s approach still leaves us with some tensions, however. He puts 
the point powerfully: 
To theorize the value of democratic competence is to confront a 
seeming paradox. Democratic legitimation requires that the 
speech of all persons be treated with toleration and equality. 
Democratic competence, by contrast, requires that speech be 
subject to a disciplinary authority that distinguishe  good ideas 
from bad ones. Yet democratic competence is necessary for 
democratic legitimation. Democratic competence is thus both 
incompatible with democratic legitimation and required by it.219 
Post’s response to this “seeming paradox” follows from his own view 
that democratic self-government is the primary end of the First 
Amendment. He writes that “[i]t is plain that within public discourse the 
value of democratic legitimation enjoys lexical priority,” but suggests 
that we can still safeguard democratic competence by treating it as lying 
“outside public discourse.”220 This approach allows him to safeguard 
those realms in which expert knowledge is generated while still 
preserving a central role for “public discourse,” understood in strongly 
democratic terms, within his general approach to free speech. It also, 
perhaps, allows him to avoid some of the barbs that have been aimed at 
                                                   
argument in Chapter 9 of HORWITZ, supra note 15. 
218. See supra notes 180–87 and accompanying text. 
219. POST, supra note 8, at 34. 
220. Id. (emphasis added). 
09 -- Horwitz FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:17 AM 
2012] THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 479 
 
his conception of public discourse itself, which his critics argue over-
emphasizes political speech and fails to account for important aspects of 
current First Amendment doctrine.221 In short, Post is able to resolve the 
seeming paradox he describes—but only through considerable and 
somewhat gymnastic effort. 
The problem, it seems to me, lies with Post’s particular definition of 
and emphasis on “public discourse.” Although I agree that public 
discourse, understood broadly as “the forms of 
communication . . . necessary for [the] formation of public opinion,”222 
is at or near the core of the First Amendment, I want to emphasize two 
points of difference with Post’s approach. 
First, although Post emphasizes the complex dialectcal relationship 
between constitutional law and culture,223 his treatment of public 
discourse still relies heavily on legal categories and doctrines, and on 
abstract concepts such as “democratic legitimation” a d “democratic 
competence,” rather than on more concrete cultural phenomena. I 
question whether this is the best approach. If we want to fully appreciate 
and improve “the relationship between the First Amendment and the 
practices that create and sustain . . . knowledge,”224 we should focus 
more directly on those practices themselves. Instead of focusing on legal 
categories, or abstract concepts such as “democratic competence,” we 
might focus more directly on the real-world institutions that play a key 
role in creating and transmitting knowledge.225 
Second, although Post writes that public discourse encompasses more 
                                                   
221. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free 
Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567 (2011). 
222. POST, supra note 8, at 15. 
223. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1280–81 (1995) (“First Amendment doctrine can recover its rightful role as an 
instrument for the clarification and guidance of judicial decisionmaking only if the Court refashions 
its jurisprudence . . . so as to generate a perspicuous understanding of the necessary material and 
normative dimensions of these forms of social order and of the relationship of speech to these 
values and dimensions.”). 
224. POST, supra note 8, at ix–x. 
225. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 15 (discussing the actual and potential role in F rst 
Amendment law and public discourse of “First Amendment institutions” such as libraries, 
universities, churches, and the press); Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional 
Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007) (arguing for the value of institutionally based analysis in 
constitutional law generally); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1265, 1278 (2005) (arguing that our First Amendment categories might be 
altered to “recognize those informational, investigative, and communicative domains whose more-
or-less distinctive properties warrant special First Amendment treatment”).  
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than just “majoritarianism and elections,”226 there is a still a decided 
emphasis on formal politics, and on the state itself, in his treatment of 
public discourse. He denies that his definition of public discourse is 
narrowly concerned with “political” speech, but justifies the breadth of 
public discourse on the basis that “public opinion ca  direct government 
action in an endless variety of directions.”227 He stresses that public 
opinion is “a far wider category than communications about potential 
government decision making” and includes “what a society generally 
believes and thinks.”228 Yet his discussion returns frequently to the state 
itself—to the importance of holding “governmental decision 
making . . . accountable to public opinion.”229 For Post, it seems, the 
subjects of public discourse are broad, but its ultimate end is narrow: it is 
the formation of legal authority and the making of legal decisions. He 
champions popular sovereignty, but views “government institutions” as 
the most important instantiation of that sovereignty.230 
F.  An Institutional Approach to Knowledge and the First Amendment 
That is not the only way to envision public discourse, or the broader 
social structure of which it is both means and end. As a sociological and 
structural matter—and, I would add, as a normative matter231—we need 
not think of our social structure as originating or culminating in the state 
itself. Rather, we might think of our social structre, and particularly 
those aspects of it bearing on the First Amendment, as a broader 
“infrastructure” of which the state is only one part.232 Universities, for 
example, do not just serve public discourse, and through it the 
                                                   
226. POST, supra note 8, at 17. 
227. Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
228. Post, supra note 14, at 621. 
229. Post, supra note 175, at 482 (emphasis added). 
230. See Post, supra note 14, at 621. 
231. See C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 515, 519–20 (2011) (exploring the normative and sociological aspects of Post’s approach); 
Post, supra note 175, at 485 (arguing that “[t]he boundary between public discourse and nonpublic 
discourse is . . . ultimately a normative one”). 
232. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 15; Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a 
Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 432 (2009) (arguing that “[a] system of free speech 
depends . . . on an infrastructure of free expression” that “includes the kinds of media and 
institutions for knowledge, creation, and dissemination that are available at any point in time”); 
Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion 
Clauses, 53 VILL . L. REV. 273, 274 (2008) (arguing that a variety of institutions, public and private, 
play a central infrastructural role “in clearing out and protecting the civil-society space within which 
the freedom of speech can be well exercised”).  
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democratic legitimacy of the state. They are infrastructural institutions 
that form a fundamental part of a larger public sphere. The state is 
clearly one of those infrastructural institutions too, and it may play a 
unique coordinating role within our social structure.233 But it is still 
ultimately only a coequal institution.234 
Nor are universities the only example. A variety of institutions, 
including the press, libraries, and others, play an infrastructural role, 
both in society in general and within public discourse, broadly 
understood.235 They are no less necessary and important than the stat
itself. Over time, these institutions have developed a host of norms, 
practices, and traditions by which knowledge and other social goods are 
generated, scrutinized, and disseminated.236 They are just as defined and 
constrained by function, discipline, and custom as the university. 
If we proceed from this set of assumptions—that the relationship 
between the First Amendment and the production of kn wledge requires 
different descriptive categories than those currently used by the courts, 
and that the state is just one part of a broader social structure that 
contains a variety of important infrastructural inst tutions—then we 
might approach the same project differently. Rather t an focusing on 
broad legal categories like “content neutrality,” or c nceptual categories 
like “democratic legitimation” or “democratic competence,” we might 
use a very different set of categories. 
In particular, we could focus on specific real-world institutions 
themselves. Rather than ask whether particular speech counts as public 
discourse or not, and rather than thinking in terms of the “lexical 
priority” of democratic legitimation—understood in ways that privilege 
                                                   
233. Cf. Paul Q. Hirst, Introduction to THE PLURALIST THEORY OF THE STATE: SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF G.D.H. COLE, J.N. FIGGIS, AND H.J. LASKI 1, 17 (Paul Q. Hirst ed., 1989) 
(characterizing John Neville Figgis’ description of the state as a “society of societies, charged with 
the task of making the continued existence and mutual interaction of such [other] associations 
possible through setting rules for their conduct”). 
234. That the state might be treated as a coequal with these institutions does not mean there are 
no special reasons to be concerned with the state. Giv n the coercive power the state possesses, both 
as a matter of fact and because of its central coordinating role within the social structure, arguments 
for distrust of government may still hold, and First Amendment doctrine may justifiably continue to 
apply special rules to speech-suppressing state action. But we should do so for functional reasons, 
rather than treating the state’s coercive power as conclusive evidence that it takes primacy over or is 
superior to the other infrastructural institutions I discuss here. I am grateful to Ashutosh Bhagwat 
for pressing me on this point.  
235. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 15 (describing universities, the press, librares, 
voluntary associations, and churches as “First Amendment institutions,” and speculating about the 
possibility of other such institutions). 
236. For illustrations of this point using the press a  an example, see, for example, Blocher, supra 
note 16, and Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011). 
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the state itself as the end of public discourse—over d mocratic 
competence,237 we could ask a different set of questions. Is a particular 
institution a part of our social infrastructure, broadly understood? Does it 
constitute a sort of “sovereign sphere,” an institution or area of activity 
that is a fundamental part of the equipment of civil society?238 For 
purposes of the First Amendment, is the institution one that has long 
been recognized as playing an infrastructural role in contributing to 
public discourse, one supported both by history and by a substantial set 
of self-regulatory norms, practices, and traditions? If so, that institution 
may be regulated around the edges by the state, but should be 
acknowledged as a coequal part of the institutional structure of civil 
society. 
Additionally, if the answer to these questions is ye , might there be 
some value in treating those institutions as constitutionally entitled to a 
substantial measure of autonomy? That is, having ident fied the 
institutions that play an infrastructural part in public discourse, broadly 
conceived, might we view them as being entitled to a good deal of 
freedom to regulate themselves, free of the usual, and often ill-fitting, 
rules and doctrines of the First Amendment? Rather than characterizing 
universities as engaged in “nonpublic discourse,” or focusing on the 
contribution that their “democratic competence” makes to the 
“democratic legitimation” of public discourse, might we simply 
recognize them as substantially autonomous “First Amendment 
institutions” tout court? 
This is not the place to fully develop this approach or defend it 
against potential criticisms. There are potential problems with this 
approach.239 But there are potential benefits too. I focus on three of them 
here. 
First, this institutionally oriented approach helps to address and 
                                                   
237. POST, supra note 8, at 34. 
238. See generally Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and 
Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009). See also, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Assessing the 
Constitutional Autonomy of Such Non-State Institutions as the Press and Academia, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 141; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. 
L. REV. 91, 91 (1953); Franklin G. Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: Non-State Associations and the 
Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 365 (2004); Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative, and 
Adjudication: Toward a Jurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 1623 (1999) (“The 
heart of the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government must recognize that it is not the sol
possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the community are entitled to lead their 
own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to justify 
labeling it a sovereign authority.”). 
239. I address potential criticisms of First Amendment institutionalism in Chapter 10 of 
HORWITZ, supra note 15.  
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resolve the troubled relationship between the First Amendment and the 
production of knowledge. A number of institutions and activities—the 
press, libraries, universities, churches, and others—play a key role in the 
production of knowledge in our society. Moreover, they do so through a 
host of disciplinary and self-regulatory practices that do not fit easily 
into existing First Amendment rules and categories. These institutions’ 
practices are inconsistent with some of the fundamental precepts of First 
Amendment jurisprudence: that there is no such thing as a false idea, 
that all speakers are equal, and so on. Such practices—academic 
disciplinarity; expertise in newsgathering and editing, and a host of 
ethical constraints in journalism; the professional practices of libraries; 
and others—ensure that knowledge is produced and protected in a 
careful and responsible manner. Even when individuals or entities within 
these institutions fail, as they sometimes will, a host of broader 
institutional practices serve to expose those errors t  professional 
criticism. For reasons of epistemic authority and comparative 
institutional competence, the responsibility for overseeing these error-
correcting mechanisms should lie primarily with the institutions 
themselves and secondarily with public criticism of those institutions, 
but only rarely with the courts.240 In short, a focus on identifying and 
granting substantial autonomy to those institutions that play an 
infrastructural role in public discourse may do a better job of 
encouraging and protecting the expert production of knowledge than a 
mildly modified and somewhat abstract version of current First 
Amendment doctrine, such as Post’s. 
Second, by acknowledging the autonomy of these institutions, an 
institutional approach may ease some of the second-order epistemic 
questions that arise in the relationship between th courts, as interpreters 
of the First Amendment, and the production of knowledge. It may be 
asking too much of judges to let them decide whether particular speech 
is “public discourse” or “nonpublic discourse,” or t  let them categorize 
particular forms of speech as falling within “democratic competence” or 
“democratic legitimacy.” A more categorical instituonal approach, 
although it will pose some difficult definitional and boundary questions, 
may represent a more appropriate allocation of authority to those 
                                                   
240. For more on the role of institutional self-criti ism and public criticism—but not judicial 
review—in restraining First Amendment institutions, see Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial 
Exception, NW U. L. REV. COLLOQUY (2011), 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/27/LRColl2011n27Horwitz.pdf. For 
discussion of the boundaries and limits of First Amendment institutionalism, including limitations 
on institutionalism that leave room for judicial revi w, see HORWITZ, supra note 15.  
09 -- Horwitz FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:17 AM 
484 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:445 
 
institutions that are most competent to decide these questions. A 
university or newspaper may be better qualified than a court to judge 
whether particular actions fall within the sphere of its own competence 
and constitute appropriate exercises of expertise and authority. 
Finally, an institutional approach may do a better job of recognizing 
the various ways in which expert knowledge is generated and 
disseminated to the wider public. By focusing on academic freedom, 
Post concentrates on one institution—the university—that produces what 
we think of as expert knowledge. But other, equally expert institutions 
create and disseminate knowledge as well. 
Consider the press. Post zealously defends freedom of the press, but 
his account can be read as having more to do with democratic 
legitimation than democratic ompetence. He sees the press primarily as 
a vehicle for the dissemination of public opinion, and writes that the 
First Amendment presumptively protects “media for the communication 
of ideas, like newspapers, magazines, [or] the Internet, . . . which are the 
primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain 
the public sphere.”241 As Joseph Blocher observes, however, this sells 
the press short.242 Press practices are rich with disciplinary standards and 
well-developed self-regulatory norms and practices.243 Nor does the 
press simply disseminate the knowledge or opinions of others. It 
produces knowledge, through a host of skills, practices, andresources 
that are not generally available to most citizens.244 The role of the 
                                                   
241. POST, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasis added); see also id. at 44 (distinguishing between the 
disciplinary speech of a biologist within the university, and the speech of a biologist who writes an 
op-ed in The New York Times, which Post seems to treat as mere opinion falling within public 
discourse). 
242. See Blocher, supra note 16, at 426–28. 
243. For one of many examples, see Code of Ethics, SOC’Y PROF’ L JOURNALISTS (1996), 
http://www.spj.org.pdf/ethicscode.pdf. For a general effort to catalogue basic principles of press 
ethics and professionalism, see Bill Kovach & Tom Rosenstiel, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 
(2001). 
244. This kind of statement is often met with skepticism by those who question the job done by 
the modern press, and argue that the rise of citizen journalism on the Internet shows that anyone 
could do as well as professional journalists. My view is that despite their failings, professional 
journalistic enterprises possess a variety of newsgathering techniques and self-regulatory practices 
not generally shared by the wider public. The question of Internet journalism complicates things, 
but not much. A good deal of Internet “journalism” still consists of commentary on reporting 
already done by the professional press. To the extent that there has been an increase in serious 
reporting on the part of Internet journalists, it has come mostly from those who have increasingly 
absorbed the professional skills and norms of the institutional press. For more on press 
professionalism and its worth, see HORWITZ, supra note 15, ch. 6; Paul Horwitz, “Or of the 
[Blog] ,” 11 NEXUS 45 (2006) [hereinafter Horwitz, “Or of the [Blog]”]; Randall P. Bezanson, 
Whither Freedom of the Press, 97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982616. 
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institutional press in the recent Wikileaks disclosures demonstrates this 
point, both in the information it helped bring to light and in the 
selectivity of editors and reporters in choosing which disclosures to 
publish.245 
In short, an institutional approach to the First Amendment may do a 
better job of recognizing a variety of institutions, each of which 
contributes in unique ways to the production of knowledge and deserves 
protection or autonomy. This approach dissolves Post’s distinction 
between democratic legitimacy and democratic competenc . But it may 
give greater recognition to a host of “democratically competent” 
institutions and, in the long run, better improve the state of public 
knowledge.246 
Post acknowledges the possibility of a more robustly institutional 
approach to the First Amendment. He sympathizes with the 
institutionalists’ view that courts ought to “incorporate and apply the 
disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”247 At 
bottom, however, he finds the institutional approach “implausible.”248 
Given the fact that we regularly regulate professional speech, he writes, 
“[a] constitutional theory that immediately converts every effort to 
regulate professional practice into a constitutional question is surely 
suspect.”249 
But there is a difference between broad institutional autonomy and 
total regulatory immunity. The point of First Amendment 
institutionalism is not to grant absolute immunity to every action 
performed by a First Amendment institution. It is to make sure that the 
                                                   
245. For an inside account, see Bill Keller, The Boy Who Kicked the Hornet’s Nest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 2011 (Magazine), at 32. For a thoughtful discussion of the Wikileaks episode and the 
gradual convergence between mainstream media journalism nd online journalism, see Yochai 
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked 
Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011). 
246. As an additional point, as long as the press is treated under the rubric of democratic 
legitimacy rather than democratic competence, it is more likely to receive only a negative form of 
protection, in which it is free from discriminatory egulation but given little positive protection for 
fundamental practices such as newsgathering. Institutional protection for the press may thus result 
in more vigorous newsgathering, which will produce more “truth” and thus make a stronger 
contribution to public discourse. See, e.g., Horwitz, “Or of the [Blog],” supra note 244; West, supra 
note 236. 
247. POST, supra note 8, at 54. 
248. Id. at 51. 
249. Id. Note that Post assumes that professional speech, su as that of lawyers and doctors, 
would fall within the scope of First Amendment insttutionalism. That assumption is debatable, 
although in my forthcoming book I conclude that thecase for institutional treatment of professional 
speech is reasonably strong. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, ch. 10. 
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shape of First Amendment law is responsive to the nature and function 
of those institutions. A university might be entitled to substantial legal 
autonomy with respect to a properly made academic decision, no matter 
how mistaken that decision might seem to outsiders. But an 
institutionally minded court could still insist before ceding its own 
authority that the university be acting within its scope as a university, 
and making an academic decision. A dean’s decision to approve or veto 
a tenure vote is an academic decision that falls squarely within the 
infrastructural role of the university. It is directly related to the 
accumulation of knowledge through disciplinary stand rds that 
constitutes the university’s unique contribution to our social order. Her 
arbitrary decision to shoot trespassers on sight is not, and does not call 
for institutional autonomy or judicial deference. 
Of course these questions present their own difficulties. Although I 
doubt that the boundary questions raised by an institutional approach are 
more difficult than those raised by a court deciding whether some speech 
act falls within the category of democratic legitimacy or democratic 
competence, or even the familiar question whether a law is viewpoint-
neutral, questions would certainly remain. That is not a sufficient reason 
to reject the institutional approach, however. Constitutional law always 
involves boundary questions. The point is that the institutional approach 
would draw its boundaries from actual social practices, and so might 
enhance, rather than obscure or complicate, the relationship between the 
First Amendment and the real-world practices by which knowledge is 
generated. 
We need not resolve all these questions here. The aim of this Part has 
not been to solve the question of how the First Amendment should 
protect the production of knowledge; it has been to sh w that the 
question exists. As Post writes, the “relationship between the First 
Amendment and the practices that create and sustain . . . knowledge”250 
raises complex questions that are worthy of serious examination. It is 
sufficient simply to show that these questions are worthy of attention. 
IV. LESSONS LEARNED 
As I warned at the outset, I have offered few answer  to the First 
Amendment’s epistemological problem. It may be more important for 
now to ask the right questions than to supply an answer. Before we can 
hope to resolve the First Amendment’s epistemological problem, we 
                                                   
250. POST, supra note 8, at x. 
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must see that there is a problem. We must see that despite centuries of 
theorizing and decades of jurisprudential development, we still face a 
large and important set of unanswered questions about the relationship 
between truth, falsity, freedom of speech, and the production and 
protection of knowledge. 
Among the scholars examined in this Article, all of whom have made 
recent contributions to the recognition and discussion of the 
epistemological problems raised by the First Amendment, there are still 
important differences. Some focus on true statements, and others on 
false or worthless statements.251 Some focus not on truth or falsity as 
such, but on whether and how the First Amendment encourages the 
production of knowledge.252 Some see the answer to that question as 
involving existing doctrinal categories, or broad con epts such as 
“democratic legitimacy” or “democratic competence.”253 Others think 
the relationship between knowledge and the First Amendment can be 
improved by altering the categories we employ within the First 
Amendment altogether. 254 
What matters most, however, is that these scholars are all asking the 
same questions. They are all revisiting the usual assumptions that have 
governed in this area—that there is “no such thing as a false idea,” that 
all speakers enjoy equal status in the search for truth, and so on. They 
are asking similar questions about the epistemological basis and 
assumptions of the First Amendment: about the relationship between the 
First Amendment and truth, falsity, and the production of knowledge. 
This sudden surge in interest in the epistemological problems 
underlying the First Amendment suggests a number of general 
conclusions and forward-looking questions. I offer them in a purely 
speculative spirit, in the hope that they will illuminate the ground we 
stand on and help us to advance. 
First, it should be plain that the First Amendment, at the level of both 
theory and practice, is inextricably linked to a host f epistemological 
questions. The First Amendment deals with communication, after all, 
and most human communication consists of an attempt to obtain, 
understand, and express the truth.255 Thus, First Amendment law will 
                                                   
251. Compare Bhagwat, supra note 3 (true statements), with Tushnet, supra note 4 (lies), and 
Gey, supra note 34 (worthless statements). 
252. See, e.g., POST, supra note 8; Schauer, supra note 2. 
253. See, e.g., POST, supra note 8. 
254. I include myself here, see HORWITZ, supra note 15, although this is true of Schauer’s work 
as well, see, e.g., Schauer, supra note 225. 
255. See, e.g., ALVIN I. GOLDMAN , KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 3 (1999) (“Question asking 
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inevitably be concerned with epistemically freighted concepts such as 
truth, falsity, accuracy, and reliability.256 
Second, the discussion of these epistemological questions within First 
Amendment theory and doctrine will often be indirect. “[W]hat actually 
is speech or conduct is a complicated question as a matter of 
epistemology,” writes Edward Eberle. “But First Amendment law is not 
epistemology. Rather, free speech is a constitutional domain.”257 First 
Amendment law itself will often operate at one remove from 
epistemological questions, focusing instead on doctrinal matters such as 
how to reconcile past precedents or craft judicially manageable rules. 
Where deep questions about the nature of truth and falsity are concerned, 
courts will rely on general statements and incompletely theorized 
agreements258 and leave the theorizing to others. 
There are good reasons for this, to be sure. Judges ar  not 
philosophers. But precisely because courts operate in this manner, the 
epistemological questions left in their wake are sometimes all the more 
glaring. In the course of an opinion, a court may toss in a line with 
profound tremendous epistemic import, such as that t ere is no such 
thing as a false idea. But such broad statements rarely resolve specific 
cases. Indeed, they only create further conflicts, as a court struggles to 
apply or distinguish that statement in a later case. So the questions 
remain, or multiply. 
This, in a nutshell, is the First Amendment’s epistemological 
problem. Again, it is a problem, not a crisis. In general, free speech 
doctrine makes a good deal of sense. Occasionally, however, as with the 
Alvarez case, these broader epistemic questions return to the foreground. 
There may be no final resolution of the First Amendment’s 
epistemological problems. But the fact that so many scholars have 
recently focused on these questions is worth noticing in itself, making it 
                                                   
is a universal feature of human communication and the prototype of a truth-seeking practice. The 
primary purpose of asking a question is to learn the answer, the true answer, from the respondent.”). 
256. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 
NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1138–61 (1983) (arguing that all justifications for freedom of expression 
ultimately reduce to an “epistemic value” involving the need to protect useful “information and 
ideas”). 
257. Edward J. Eberle, Cross Burning, Hate Speech, and Free Speech in America, 36 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 953, 964 (2004). 
258. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: 
Determining What the “Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1678 (2011) (“The 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is . . . one of the many areas characterized by 
incompletely theorized agreements.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
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important to gather and evaluate these treatments in one place. It makes 
more apparent the fundamental epistemic questions pre ented by the 
theory and doctrine of the First Amendment. 
With respect to theory, the free speech justification that addresses 
these epistemological questions most directly, and thus might seem to 
have the best chance of providing useful answers to them, is the truth-
seeking justification.259 Closer examination, however, suggests that even 
this justification tells us surprisingly little about the relationship between 
the First Amendment and specific questions involving true or false 
facts.260 Moreover, free speech theory itself has increasingly retreated 
from epistemic arguments and focused instead on other justifications, 
such as democratic self-government or individual autonomy.261 
We might see this shift in focus as a product of modern skepticism 
“about the ability of truth to emerge and about the capacity of falsehood 
to be exposed.”262 It might suggest that other factors, such as distrust of 
government, are more important than whether particular propositions are 
true or false.263 Or perhaps the decline of truth-seeking arguments for 
freedom of speech, and the rise of other justificatons, simply reflects a 
desire to avoid the intractable epistemological questions we have 
encountered here. Whatever the reason, it seems clear that no matter 
which theory of the First Amendment one turns to, there is no getting 
around the epistemological problems posed by the First Amendment. 
Our discussion also suggests something about the relationship 
between the kinds of speech that are of central concern to the First 
Amendment and the kinds of knowledge institutions that we discussed in 
Part III: it reminds us of the social nature of the discourse and 
knowledge practices that are most highly prized by the First 
Amendment.264 Much of the iconography of the First Amendment 
focuses on heroic dissenters, soapbox speakers, and other individualistic 
images. In reality, however, most important speech takes place in a 
deeply social context, and even individual speakers use language and 
                                                   
259. See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 2, at 911 (“[O]f all of the justifications for a free speech 
principle, the epistemic arguments are the only ones that are even in the vicinity of addressing the 
question of factual falsity.”). 
260. See id. at 907. 
261. See id. at 910; see also Schauer, supra note 118, at 309. 
262. Schauer, supra note 118, at 309.  
263. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 34, at 16–22; Varat, supra note 51, at 1116–22. 
264. See, e.g., GOLDMAN , supra note 255, at 4 (“An enormous portion of our truth seeking . . . is 
either directly or indirectly social.”). 
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ideas that are formed through social interaction. 265 
Moreover, many of the key sites in which knowledge is discovered 
and disseminated are not just social, but institutional.266 Knowledge is 
formed and spread through particular institutions, characterized by 
various forms of professional expertise and self-regulatory norms and 
practices. This is true of the press, universities, libraries, and other 
institutions that form the key infrastructural institutions of the First 
Amendment—and of public discourse itself. Thus, if we want to learn 
anything about the First Amendment’s epistemological problems, let 
alone resolve them, we must think about them largely in institutional 
terms. Particular institutions are key repeat players in the generation of 
knowledge. If we want to ensure that the First Amendment serves 
knowledge and its dissemination within public discourse, we need to pay 
close attention to those institutions and their “disciplinary practices.”267 
CONCLUSION: WHY NOW? 
I want to close this conversation with Post’s book, and with the other 
scholars whose work I have examined here, by inviting more 
conversation. I end this Article not with a summary, but with another 
question: Why have so many leading scholars suddenly focused on the 
same questions about the relationship between truth, falsity, and the First 
Amendment? What led them to roughly the same place at the same time? 
Legal scholars are often led to examine the same question by a 
pending or recently decided case. The Stolen Valor Act case, Alvarez, is 
an obvious candidate here, as are the Court’s recent decisions in Stevens 
and Brown. But some of the recent scholarship addressing the First 
Amendment’s epistemological problems either predates th se decisions 
or barely addresses them. A particularly important paper can spark 
scholarly interest, and Schauer’s article on facts and the First 
Amendment has clearly inspired others. Again, however, some of the 
recent scholarly treatments predate Schauer’s article.268 It remains a 
puzzle why this issue erupted into the scholarly cons iousness at the 
moment it did and to the degree it has. 
But I mean “why now?” in a deeper sense as well. As we have seen, 
                                                   
265. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 15 (arguing that First Amendment tropes often focus on 
single individual speakers arrayed against the state, when most speech, including important 
individual speech, is actually formed in and through institutions). 
266. See, e.g., GOLDMAN , supra note 255, at 163. 
267. POST, supra note 8, at 55. 
268. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 34; Varat, supra note 51.  
09 -- Horwitz FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:17 AM 
2012] THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 491 
 
one common feature of a number of these articles, as well as Post’s 
important new book, is their recognition of the connection between the 
First Amendment and institutions. Much recent First Amendment 
scholarship is deeply concerned with the role of institutions within First 
Amendment doctrine.269 
This seems an odd time to be turning to institutions. It is—or so we 
keep being told—an era of widespread distrust of public and private 
institutions.270 Unlike earlier eras, such as the two decades following the 
Second World War, there is a lack of consensus about the 
trustworthiness of our institutions and their leaders, and a diminished 
willingness to defer to them.271 The institutions, including universities, 
that we once associated with “expertise and social-s ientific knowledge” 
have become associated instead with “arrogance and insularity.”272 Faith 
in expertise itself has come under assault, as the popular debate over the 
science of global warming demonstrates. 
Moreover, this is the Internet era, in which top-down knowledge is 
disdained and it is widely argued that truth can be more reliably 
discovered and shared through peer-to-peer processes involving amateur 
journalists,273 amateur scholars—amateur everything. Of all the times to 
turn back to institutions, and to even consider granting greater degrees of 
constitutional protection or autonomy to those institutions, why now? 
The possible answers to this question have a variety of potential 
                                                   
269. In addition to the sources already cited, see, for example, Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 
DUKE L.J. 821 (2008); Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Representative Tension: Student Religious Speech 
and the Public School’s Institutional Mission, 38 J.L. &  EDUC. 1 (2009); Anuj C. Desai, The 
Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern 
First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671 (2007); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional 
Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144 (2003); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging 
First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (2008); Michael R. 
Siebecker, Building a “New Institutional” Approach to Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247 
(2008); Michael R. Siebecker, Corporate Speech, Securities Regulation, and an Institutional 
Approach to the First Amendment, 48 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 613 (2006); Russell H. Falconer, Note, 
Institutional Rights, Individual Litigants: Standing to Sue Under the Press Clause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
1223 (2009).  
270. For a general discussion, see, for example, HUGH HECLO, ON THINKING INSTITUTIONALLY  
(2008). 
271. See, e.g., George Packer, The New Liberalism, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 543, 552 (2009); Frank 
Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. 
ILL . L. REV. 599, 611; John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 46 (2003). 
272. John O. McGinnis, A Politics of Knowledge, NAT’ L AFFAIRS, Winter 2012, at 59. 
273. See, e.g., SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PRESS AND THE RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007). 
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implications for our understanding of both the First Amendment and our 
social order. It may show that our distrust of “government” in general 
vastly outweighs our distrust of individual instituons. It may suggest a 
degree of exhaustion with the rhapsodies of the Intrnet utopians and 
political populists, and a sense that institutions ught to weigh more 
heavily in the balance than they currently do. Perhaps it indicates that 
rather than distrust institutions as such, we have become more interested 
in institutional pluralism: in encouraging the spread of a host of 
institutions within a social sphere in which the role f the state itself is 
diminished. Even if we distrust particular institutions, we may believe 
that there is real value in allowing them to exist and experiment with 
minimal state interference.274 
Or perhaps it simply means the pendulum is beginning to swing in the 
opposite direction. We have been through a period of isenchantment 
with experts, expertise, and institutions, during which First Amendment 
law took an increasingly top-down approach, treating i stitutions the 
same as everyone else.275 Perhaps we are starting to remember that some 
institutions are less fungible, and more vital to our system of free speech 
and the production of knowledge, than we have assumed. Some 
institutions may require institutional protection if they are to serve their 
proper function within our public sphere.276 
It is unlikely that the broader debate over the social and legal value of 
institutions, and their relationship to truth and knowledge, will end any 
time soon. Whether Post’s reliance on those institutions that exemplify 
“democratic competence,” or my own focus on “First Amendment 
institutions,” will influence the courts in the long run will depend on the 
complex and porous relationship between constitutional law and public 
culture.277 In the meantime, Post’s book, and the other recent 
contributions surveyed in this Article, suggest that the First 
                                                   
274. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF . L. REV. 485 (2002). 
275. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc. v. Martinez, 561 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (applying 
public forum law to law school’s treatment of student groups and refusing to recognize need for 
differential treatment of religious student group); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010) (refusing to distinguish between media corporations and other corporations); Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (rejecting a press challenge to a generally applicable law); 
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding tha  no Free Exercise Clause claim exists against 
a neutral, generally applicable law that only incidentally burdens religion).  
276. Although it would be a mistake to read too much into it too soon, this is certainly one 
potential implication of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision upholding the ministerial 
exception, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 
694 (2012). 
277. See POST, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
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Amendment’s epistemological problem and the role of particular 
institutions within public discourse demand further attention. 
 
